An awful lot of question marks are floating around financial journalism these days -- an apt symbol of how much the media really know about this stuff.
Sentence of the Week
China's Manufacturing Slowest in 9 Months, New Orders Suggest Manufacturing May Have Already Peaked; Australia Biggest GDP Drop in 20 Years
MarketWatch reports China manufacturing growth slows further
The official China Federation of Logistics & Purchasing Managers’ Index eased to 52.0 from 52.9 in April, marking the slowest pace of growth in nine months.Australia Reports Biggest GDP Drop in 20 Years
The result was below the median forecast of 52.2 in a Reuters survey of economists.
Meanwhile, a separate PMI published by HSBC and compiled by U.K. group Markit, showed headline activity at 51.6, easing from 51.8 in April, the slowest pace of growth in 10 months.
Analysts at Credit Suisse said that the Federation’s PMI showed new orders declining at a faster pace than the slowdown in the overall reading, a sign that manufacturing activity may have already peaked in the current economic cycle.
“Actual economic activity may have cooled down faster than the headline suggests,” said Credit Suisse analysts.
The BBC reports Australian economy reports biggest fall in twenty years
Its economy contracted by 1.2% in the first three months of the year, compared with the previous quarter, the latest government figures showed.That temporary pothole is about to become a Grand Canyon led by declines in housing and retail spending.
The government said flooding and cyclones in resource rich states of Queensland and Western Australia had a significant impact on growth.
Australia's economy is heavily reliant on its resources sector.
"The economy has hit a temporary pothole courtesy of the natural disasters this year," said Besa Deda of St George Bank.
Chicago Region Manufacturing Gauge Biggest Drop in 2.5 Years
Please consider Chicago manufacturing gauge nosedives
A Chicago-area manufacturing gauge dropped by the largest amount in nearly two-and-half years in May, in a further sign that the rise in oil prices and the Japanese earthquake have affected activity.US Consumer Confidence Declines
The Chicago PMI fell to a reading of 56.6% in May, the lowest reading since Nov. 2009, from 67.6% in April.
While that reading is still significantly above the 50-line indicating growth, the eleven-point drop is the biggest one-month deceleration since Oct. 2008 and was worst than the 60% reading that economists polled by MarketWatch anticipated.
Indexes for production, new orders and order backlogs each dropped by double digits. Inventories jumped, which in this case is more likely an indication of unplanned gains due to a lack of sales than stocking up in anticipation of better times ahead.
Rounding out a torrent of bad news for the day, U.S. consumer confidence declines in May
The nonprofit Conference Board said its consumer-confidence index fell to 60.8 in May — the lowest reading in six months — from a revised 66 in April. Economists polled by MarketWatch had forecast an increase to 67.5.In a healthy economy the index averages 95. Currently it sits at 60.8.
Most economists were surprised by the decline. Some attributed the drop to the cost of gas, a downward spiral in housing prices, recent weakness in the economy, and even to a series of tornados and floods wracking parts of the U.S.
The expectations index, which measures the view of consumers six months out, fell to 75.2 from 83.2 last month. It’s the lowest reading since last October.
The percentage of consumers who say jobs are plentiful increased to 5.6% from 5.1% in April, although the percentage who say they are hard to get also rose slightly to 43.9%.
The consumer-confidence index remains low by historical standards. In a healthy economy, the index averages about 95 points.
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Partisan Influence on Incomes
Look at the figure below, and then look at it again, and again, and again. It is the most telling picture about the U.S. political economy I have ever seen.While this chart is highly interesting, Bartels apparently argues in the book that the president's party affiliation is more than merely correlated with higher average income gains across all income groups:
What it shows is the difference that the President's party affiliation makes to the distribution of income during the four years of the president's term. (The distributional outcomes are shown with one year's lag.) When a Republican president is in power, people at the top of the income distribution experience much larger real income gains than those at the bottom--a difference of 1.5 percent per year going from the bottom to the top quintile in the income distribution. The situation is reversed when a Democrat is in power: those who benefit the most are the lower income groups. If you are in the bottom quintile, the difference between having a Democratic or a Republican president in office is an income gain (or loss) of more than 2 percent per year! Strikingly, compared to Republicans, Democratic presidents generate higher income gains for all income groups (although the difference is statistically significant only for lower income groups).
Bartels shows in his book that this difference is not a statistical artifact or a fluke. It is not the result of Democrats coming to power during better economic times, or of Republicans reining in the unsustainable excesses of Democratic administrations they replace. (It turns out that the same pattern prevails even when a Republican president is succeeded by another Republican.) These numbers are real and they are the outcome of partisan differences in policy. So if you are one of those who have bought the story that income distribution is the result of pure market forces and technological changes, with politics playing no role--think again.Obviously I haven't read the book or seen Bartels' full methodology, but I'm still not convinced. Presidents don't immediately implement all their policies upon taking office. Rodrik indicates that Bartels solves this by having the distributional outcomes lag one year. But I don't think lagging the results one year is nearly enough. It's true that presidents' agendas generally get passed at the beginning of their terms, but when a piece of legislation is enacted, many of the substantive provisions that will have the greatest effects -- administrative regulations -- are still unwritten. Congress increasingly delegates significant legislative authority to the federal agencies, so the substantive impact of the policies embodied in the legislation won't be felt until after the rulemaking process has been completed. The rulemaking process is a long and drawn-out give-and-take between agencies and (usually) the industry being regulated. Only when all the administrative regulations have come into force do the President's policies truly begin to have an effect.
This is the main reason I'm still skeptical of claims that presidential party affiliation has a statistically significant effect on income gains. It's simply not enough to say that the policies in place one year after a president is innaugurated necessarily reflect that president's policies. Bartels might well have done more than just lag the distributional outcomes one year; I guess I'll have to read the book to find out. But until I get a closer look at his methodology, I remain skeptical of the claim that presidential party affiliation has a statistically significant effect on income gains.
Misunderstanding Competition
Rather than handing out more government subsidies, we should inject more competition into markets by allowing people to buy health-insurance policies across state lines. This would give the uninsured a broader menu of affordable options and allow companies to market national plans.Repeat after me: Forcing private health insurers to compete with a government-run single-payer option increases the level of competition. If private health insurance is truly better than a government-run single-payer option, then you should have nothing to worry about. No one will buy into the government-run option, the private health insurance market will prevail, and you can congratulate yourselves with a big round of "I told you so."
When you actively try to block the government from extending a single-payer option to everyone (that is, everyone who isn't eligible for Medicare, Medicaid, etc.), that's called "anti-competitive behavior." Before you push for "more competition" instead of "socialized medicine," it would help if you understand the concept of competition.
"The Longer you Wait the Higher the Haircut. Greece is not Even in the EU's Hands. Let this be a Warning to the U.S."
If the video does not play here is the Bloomberg link Sovereign Trends' Keeley Interview
Terrence Keeley, senior managing principal at Sovereign Trends LLC and a Bloomberg Television contributing editor, discusses the outlook for additional aid to Greece from the European Union. EU officials will decide on more aid by the end of June and have ruled out a “total restructuring” of the nation’s debt, said Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the group of euro-area finance ministers. Keeley speaks with Erik Schatzker on Bloomberg Television's "InsideTrack."Key Quotes
- The Longer you wait the higher the haircut.
- Germany backed off over bank threats, Europe is ill-prepared for restructuring.
- A lot of people talk about getting Greece back on its feet. The truth of the matter is Greece has not been on its feet for several millennium
- 40% of Greek GDP is government workers. Until that problem is fixed there is no solution for Greece's economy.
- The reality is Greece is a goner, Ireland is very, very tough and Portugal is the same. We could have more.
- Keeping the Brady Plan in your back pocket is a very good idea.
- Everyone is clapping their hands this morning but Greek CDS imply a 70% chance of default. The market expects Greece to default, and the market is right
- This is not even in the EU's hands.
- Let this be a warning to the United states. The US can still control its situation, Greece cannot.
I agree with everything Terrence Keeley said in the interview.
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List
Planning to come up with a plan to do nothing
But wait till you see their plan for reforming international financial regulations!
[Bush and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown] are setting up a joint working group which will develop plans to monitor and regulate the banking system.Basically, their plan is to set up a committee to come up with a plan. Of course, any plan that this "joint working group" would come up with would be subject to state approval. And keep in mind that this "joint working group" is only a proposal.
So what we're left with is this: a proposed plan to set up a committee to recommend a plan that the various countries will consider approving. That's what I call decisive action!
German Unemployment January 2008
Employment growth remained robust in December 2007. According to provisional calculations of the Federal Statistical Office, the number of persons in employment in December was up by 596,000 or 1.5% on December 2006. Compared with November 2007 the number of persons in employment was down by 139,000, which was a smaller decline than is usual at this time of the year. In December 2007, there were 40.15 million persons in employment whose place of residence was Germany.
The relative increase compared with December 2006 (+1.5%) was slightly smaller than the respective increases for September, October and November (+1.6% each on a year earlier). However we need to take into account of the favourable employment situation in December 2006 (the high base effect).
As is usual at that time of the year, the number of people in employment decreased in December 2007 on the previous month. Compared with November, it was down by 139,000. That was a markedly smaller decrease than the November-to-December decreases observed on an average of the previous five years (–178,000).
The impression of robust growth is supported by the trend of the seasonally adjusted number of persons in employment, that is upon elimination of the typical seasonal fluctuations. Compared with November, the number was up by 37,000 persons. The growth of the seasonally adjusted number of persons in employment even increased slightly since July.
Based on the labour force survey, Destatis published a seasonally adjusted 3.35 million unemployed for December 2007. Compared with the same month a year earlier (December 2006), the number of unemployed was down by 530,000 persons or 13.6%. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate – which is harmonised at the EU level and measured as the share of unemployed in the total labour force – amounted to 7.8% and was thus considerably below the level of the corresponding month of the previous year (9.0%).
German Retail Sales Q4 2008
According to provisional results of the Federal Statistical Office retail trade decreased in December 2007 a nominal 4.9% and a real 6.9% compared with the corresponding month of the previous year. The number of days open for sale was 24 in December 2007 and 24 in December 2006, too. Obviously there is a certain base effect here given the pre VAT increase in sales in December 2006, but still, the level is really shockingly low.

When adjusted for calendar and seasonal variations (CENSUS-X-12-ARIMA), the December 2007 turnover was in nominal terms 0.4% and in real terms 0.1 smaller than that of the preceding month.
In 2007 turnover in retail trade in Germany was in nominal terms 1.2% and in real terms 2.2% smaller than that of the previous year.
Sales, adjusted for inflation and seasonal swings, declined 0.1 percent from November, when they dropped 1.9 percent, the Federal Statistics Office in Wiesbaden said today. Germans seem to have maintained a rather discrete level of spending after inflation accelerated last year to the fastest pace since records began in 1996, driven by a higher sales tax and rising energy prices. Retail sales fell for a fourth month in January, the Bloomberg PMI showed yesterday.
Consumer prices rose 3 percent from a year earlier in January using a harmonized European Union method, the statistics office reported today. That's well above the European Central Bank's 2 percent limit on annual price gains.

Consumer spending appears to have been hit recent by fears about inflation – German retail sales fell by 1.8 per cent in the fourth quarter of last year, according to official figures. Employment data appeared to paint a more upbeat picture - German seasonally-adjusted unemployment fell by a sharper-than-expected 89,000 this month to the lowest level for 15 years - however unemployment trends have a well known tendency to lag behind other developments in economic activity.
Eurozone inflation has soared to a 14-year high of 3.2 per cent, adding to the European Central Bank’s case a hard-line stance on future interest rate moves.
The unexpected rise from 3.1 per cent in December suggests that the “hump” in inflation caused by higher energy and food prices will prove larger and longer-lasting than anticipated by the ECB. January’s rate was the highest since the Frankfurt-institution took responsibility for monetary policy in the region in 1999.
Big Investors Betting on Deflation
Mark Hulbert says that investors in U.S. treasury bonds are betting on deflation:
"The Treasury market [is huge] and its collective judgment cannot be dismissed lightly.
***
The bond market is betting that the [consumer price index] will average less than 1 percent annually over the next decade....Economists at the Cleveland Fed have devised an econometric model that estimates [how much treasury bonds are] skewed downward by . . . liquidity considerations. That model recently calculated this bias to be around 0.5 percentage point, suggesting that the true message of the bond market right now is that inflation would average around 1.4% year over the next decade.
***
The bond market is betting on deflation.
This puts into perspective the federal government's efforts in recent months to pour huge amounts of money into the financial arena. That would otherwise be quite inflationary.But not if the forces of deflation are as large as the bond market is evidently assuming them to be.And judging by the recent performance of both the bond and gold markets, it would appear as though deflation still has the upper hand."
There are good arguments for stagflation - instead of deflation.
But if the big boys are betting on deflation with their own money, that's important information.
German Consumer Prices January 2008
The estimate is not based on the results of six Länder, as would be usual, but rather has been arrived at on a limited data basis with more forecasting was applied than usual. Consequently, the result here involves larger uncertainties. The reason is that the regular changeover of the consumer price index from base year 2000 to the new base year 2005 has not been completed yet.
On 29 February 2008, the final result for January 2008, the provisional result for February 2008 and recalculated results from January 2005 on the new basis 2005 = 100 will be released. Then the price trend will be shown in a breakdown by product groups again.
The year-on-year rate of change of the harmonised consumer price index for Germany, which is calculated for European purposes, is estimated at +3.0% for January 2008. In December 2007, the rate of change was +3.1%. Compared with the previous month, the index will be down by 0.3% in January 2008.
President Obama and the Median Voter Model
One week before the president's state of the union address he wrote in the Wall Street Journal Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System. In which he outlined that the federal government needs to cut regulation and make smart decisions about the costs of regulation. Economist Diana Furchtgott-Roth with Real Clear Markets recently wrote in her blog Obama Approaches Regulations Backwards:
"After two years of issuing regulations that have exacerbated recession-induced unemployment by discouraging job creation, President Obama has issued an executive order to evaluate whether rules and regulations have benefits that exceed costs. This backwards process-backwards because the benefit-cost calculus should have been applied first-does not inspire confidence."
However, I think she is missing a bigger point. He is not approaching this backwards, but rather like any good politician should approach the situation. With the midterm elections sending a signal that voters have moved to the right of President Obama he is doing what any good public choice scholar would expect he is trying to move toward the median voter. With two years until the next presidential elections and candidates starting to announce exploratory committees to run it is not too soon for President Obama to be looking for ways to move to the middle and try and win the vote of the median voter and a second term in office.
What Goes Up..........
In fact distressed loans in Spain's banking system reached 102.5 billion euros as of August, according to the latest Bank of Spain data. At 5.6% of the total this is the highest proportion of overall loans since 1996. "The performance of the commercial real estate sector has been the main driver of overall asset quality deterioration," Moody's said in their report. Evidently asset quality deterioration in Spain's banking system is likely to continue both this year and next, driven by oversupply in the property market, the impact of the real estate crisis on the larger economy, and the continuing high unemployment levels.
The warning about the potential impact of the continuing rise of so called “non-performing” loans has also been reiterated by the Bank of Spain itself, who draw attention, in their latest Financial Stability Report, to the fact that the banking system is very likely to face a further increase in problem loan ratios in coming quarters, an admission which effectively constitutes a revision of last April’s IMF forecast that such loans would peak in the third quarter of 2010. Unfortunately the number of distressed loans continues to rise, and the end of the problem is not yet in sight.
Indeed the latest Moody’s report comes at a time of growing uncertainty for the sector, with Spain's two largest banks - Banco Santander and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria - both releasing earnings results which disappointed the markets and gave evidence of the significant pressure they have on their margins. A further indication of the pressure they are under can be found in the fact that they have publicly attacked the slow pace of reform among the savings banks, arguing that these are using the billions of euros from the public restructuring funds to compete unfairly by offering uncompetitive rates to attract deposits.
Emilio BotĂn, Santander's chairman, was first out of the box with a speech to business leaders which criticised the “inadequate” speed of restructuring at the cajas and called for more concrete plans to cut capacity and improve margins. Then Angel Cano, chief executive of BBVA, added his voice calling for a speedy completion of the restructuring process so that bankers could begin 2011 “with equal conditions and on a level playing field”.
In another sign of the pressure they are under Spain's banks are starting to sell-off some off their most valuable branches. One popular way of doing this is to sell them and then lease them back again, a move which allows them to record a short-term transaction gain, one which can then be used to absorb and conceal losses sustained in their mortgage loan book.
According to an analysis carried out by the Wall Street Journal BBVA is about to register a gain of €233 million on a sale and leaseback of offices and buildings to a real-estate investment consortium led by Deutsche Bank AG's RREEF. The proceeds will then surely go directly toward into the bank's provisions against bad loans. Banco Sabadell also completed a similar €403 million deal in May, in which it sold and rented back 378 offices and other properties. And Caja Madrid, one of the country's largest savings banks, is reportedly looking at similar deals, following its own branch sales last year and a separate €108 million, 30-year sale-and-leaseback agreement with a unit of the German fund S.E.B. Asset Management AG in May. According to the WSJ Caja Madrid is currently in talks with investors to sell a somewhat larger package of branches, valued at €300 million, according to a spokesman for the savings bank.
And a further sign that all is not well - the banks are still having difficulty issuing covered bonds, with Spain's domestic banks currently paying a full two percentage points above the bank borrowing benchmark, as compared with a mere 0.20 percentage points before the European sovereign debt crisis erupted, according to Barclays Capital analysts Carlos Cobo Catena and Tom Rayner.
This difficulty is underlined by the evident fact that Spanish banks are falling behind their counterparts across Europe in reducing their dependence on emergency central bank funding. While Euro Area banks cut their collective borrowing in September to 514.1 billion euros, the least since the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, Spain’s banks continued to borrow 97.7 billion euros, still well above the 85.6 billion euros they borrowed in May this year, just before the debt crisis broke out.

With the Bank of Spain pressuring them to increase their provisioning for properties held on their books, the banks have been vigorously attempting to move it off them, often promoting attractive property deals on their websites, and in some cases even offering 100% financing and other deals on mortgages in an effort to sell their growing mountain of real estate, which normally comes to them through debt for asset swaps or foreclosure. But, with the sales market sluggish to virtually non-existent, banks are increasingly looking towards renting a part of their empty stock, on occassion transferring the targeted property directly from the developer to one of their off-balance-sheet subsidiaries. Banks aren't required to set aside as many provisions for assets which carry a rental stream, and none at all for assets they do not formally own.
The absence of a liquid market in Spanish housing is causing more and more problems. Before the crisis set in, homeowners who found themselves in financial difficulties had, for example, been able to sell their houses relatively easily, repay their outstanding debts, and start all over again. However, times have now changed, selling the property at a price which lets them clear the mortgage is increasingly difficult, and the banks, under pressure from their bottom line, are increasingly resorting to mortgage foreclosure. "Although lenders have historically not particularly liked extra judicial enforcement, it has become a solution among Spanish lenders in areas where the courts are saturated by cases and the foreclosure of a property may prove more speedy than the traditional enforcement procedure" says Alberto Barbachano, a Moody's Vice President and author of a recent report on the subject.
The volume of Spanish foreclosed mortgages that were taken to court grew by 126% in 2008 and 59% in 2009 on a year-on-year basis. In the first three months of 2010, 27,561 mortgages were foreclosed, a record since the economic downturn started in 2007.
In fact Moody's argue that the very high reported number of foreclosed mortgages that have been taken to court in Spain since 2007 underestimates the actual number of properties that have been repossessed by Spanish financial entities for two reasons. First, because more than one property may have been involved per individual foreclosure process. And second, because Spanish mortgage lenders have generally become more willing to sign up to voluntary agreements, accepting the property as payment in kind and then releasing the debtor from the debt.
At the present time the consumer protection organisation Adicae estimate that 1.4 million Spaniards are facing potential foreclosure proceedings, and the number is likely to continue to rise in the months to come. A recent Standard & Poor’s report found that 8 percent of Spain’s housing is now worth less than the value of the mortgage, and with prices continuing to fall, and some experts believe that figure could rise to 20 percent before the price contraction is over. So with unemployment, problem loans, and property foreclosures all rising, the only thing that seems to be falling steadily towards earth is the level of bank profitability. It is only to be hoped that with their untimely descent Spain's banks don’t bring the whole edifice of Spanish economic activity (and with it the institutional structure of the Eurozone) crashing down behind them.
German Retail Sales September 2007
When adjusted for calendar and seasonal variations, the September turnover was in nominal terms 2.6% and in real terms 2.3% larger than that of August.
Compared with the corresponding period of the previous year, retail during the first nine months of 2007 was down 0.9% in nominal terms and 1.6% in real terms than during the first nine months of 2006.

German Employment and Unemployment September 2007
Compared with the previous month of August 2007, the number of persons in employment was up by 341,000 (+0.9%) in September 2007. Seasonally adjusted, that is upon elimination of the typical seasonal fluctuations, employment rose by 36,000 persons in September 2007 on the previous month.
The employment/population ratio, that is the share of persons in employment in the total population aged 15 to 64 years, was 70.7% and thus continued to be above the European employment target agreed to be achieved in line with the so-called Lisbon Strategy by 2010.
In addition to calculating the number of persons in employment for reference month September 2007, the monthly and quarterly employment data published so far were recalculated back to February 2007 as part of the regular revision of national accounts, taking account of all sources of employment statistics now available. Altogether, the recalculation required changing the previously published monthly employment figures by a maximum of 0.1%.
Apart from the usual employment reporting, the Federal Statistical Office is now providing again an extended range of monthly unemployment data according to the internationally comparable ILO concept. The new time series is based on additional monthly processings of data from the Europe-wide harmonised labour force survey. This is the first time that monthly unemployment data are available for Germanyfrom that statistics which is carried out in a harmonised form at the EU level. For further information please refer to the methodical explanations at the end of this press release.
According to the results obtained by the method described there, a seasonally adjusted 3.51 million persons were unemployed in September 2007. That was a decrease by 600,000 (–14.7%) from September 2006. Accordingly, the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate harmonised according to the EU definition – measured as the share of unemployed in the total labour force – was 8.1%, which was considerably lower than a year earlier (9.6%).
TV Censorship in China; Reflections on the Yuan as a Global Reserve Currency; Hype Sells
Please consider a couple brief snips from Beijing in fresh TV censorship move
The Chinese government has stepped up censorship of local television in a sign of the broadening of a political crackdown that has landed many dissidents in jail.Reserve Currency Requirements
China has severely clamped down on activists since February when an anonymous online appeal called for demonstrations along the lines of the “jasmine revolution” sweeping north Africa and the Middle East.
Authorities have detained scores of human rights lawyers, activists, and writers. They have also arrested Ai Weiwei, the contemporary artist.
So what does this political crackdown say about the likelihood that the Yuan will soon replace the US dollar as the world's reserve currency? First consider what it takes to be the world's reserve currency.
- Deep, liquid, open bond markets
- Floating currency
- Property rights, civil rights
- Political stability
- Political freedom
China flunks on at least 4 of 5 points, and arguably all 5. It may be a decade before China even floats the Yuan. How long before China has a deep, liquid, bond market? You tell me, because I don't know, but I assure you it is not in the next three years.
For further discussion please see Bogus Threats to US Reserve Currency Status: No Country Really Wants It!
Yet somehow hyperinflationists persist in spreading nonsense that the Yuan is somehow on the verge of replacing the dollar as a global reserve currency and that may cause hyperinflation.
There certainly may be more local trading in the Yuan. In fact, it is likely. That does not imply the death of the dollar or the loss of reserve currency status and it certainly does not portend hyperinflation.
Hyperinflation is the complete loss of faith in a currency. Should that happen to the US, the entire global banking system blows up. Global trade blows ups. If China refuses US dollars, then China's exports to the US stop, overnight. So do Japan's.
So what does that do to the economies of Japan and China? What would that do to the economies of Canada and Australia? Think about Chinese and Japanese exports and the demand for commodities.
Whether they realize it or not, that is the story hyperinflationists peddle. It simply is not a credible story as noted in Hyperinflation Nonsense.
Hype Sells
No Virginia, the US Dollar is Not Headed to Zero any time soon. Might the dollar slowly decay over decades? Sure why not? It already has. However, that is not hyperinflation.
Yes, the US has problems, so does Japan, so does China, so does the Euro-Zone, and so does the UK. Indeed global currency problems and insolvent banks are everywhere one looks.
However, myopic eyes are primarily focused on the US. Here's the deal. The US dollar is not suddenly going to zero vs. the Pound, the Yen, the Yuan, or the Euro, yet that is what hyperinflation implies.
Why is the "hyperinflation is imminent" scare everywhere you look? The answer is simple: Hype Sells.
The bigger the hype, the sexier the story, and the more people are attracted by it.
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List
Hooray! Greece "Saved" Again; Can it Possibly Matter?
What about Ireland?
What about Portugal?
What happens when Spain needs a bailout?
What happens if the markets lose confidence in Italian debt?
Further problems in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy are all highly likely, and the first three are a given. So does, it matter that Greece is saved?
By the way, IS Greece saved? How many times can a country be saved?
In case you missed it on this long holiday weekend, please consider Europe at the Abyss; US Housing in the Abyss; Who is to Blame? for a look at structural problems facing Europe and the US and who is to blame for them.
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List
Greek Bailout News (1)
"British or German taxpayers cannot finance the failures of others," German Economy Minister Rainer Bruederle said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, according to the Associated Press. "Solidarity also means everybody adheres to common rules."
France is not working with Germany or other countries on a support package for Greece which is managing to handle its problems on its own, a French government source said on Thursday. "I am not aware of a support plan. There is not a plan. We're not discussing one (with Germany or others)," the source told Reuters. "They are managing themselves. They are finding financing support on the market. There is no plan for a support plan. We are not working on one. Le Monde newspaper said earlier that euro zone countries were studying ways of helping Greece resolve its budget problems."
The above statements have been widely interpreted in the international press as a "no" from Germany and France to any EU bailout of Greece. But is this interpretation justified? Before going further, I think it should be pointed out that the whole argument depends on what you consider a bailout to be. If you take the view that a bailout involves a restructuring of Greek Sovereign Debt, with the EU itself offering to pay a part, then this is clearly not on the cards, at least at this point, and let's take things a day at a time. But if you consider the "bailout" which is under consideration at the present time to be simply a loan, which in some way shape or form (yet to be determined) would be guaranteed by the EU institutionally, and would thus be available at a cheaper rate of interest than the one the markets are currently charging, then it is hard to see how British or German taxpayers would be having to finance anything, except in the unikely event that Greece were unable to repay (as Moody's point out, Greece's problems are longer term, not short term), and remember, even Latvia and Hungary are likely to repay the loans already made to them, and their underlying economic situation (and competitiveness problem) is a lot worse than that of Greece. So basically the German economy minister is making a speech which generates good headlines, and political enthusiasm, but like JĂĽergen Starks before him, has little real significance in terms of the options which are really on the table.
On the other hand, statements like the following:
European officials on Friday sought to quell rumors of a pending bailout for Greece, insisting that the financially troubled nation could still manage to avoid a debt crisis on its own. The effort to allay market speculation came as investor confidence in Greek bonds fell this week to levels not seen in a decade, amid concern over the government's ability to close its gaping budget deficit and maintain financial stability.
Can simply be seen as officials doing the job they are paid to do, that is talk down the market pressure. Obviously, if the spread on Greek bonds could be talked back down, then there would be no need for anyone else to make a loan, but at this point in time, and especially following the ill fated proposal of Finance Minister Papconstantinou to mount a fund raising roadshow including a visit to China, this possibility looks very unlikely. After all, why should the Chinese banks risk their money buying bonds the German taxpayer is unwilling to buy? As Yu Yongding, a former adviser to the Chinese central bank said, it just isn't interesting to buy a “large chunk” of Greek government debt in order to help rescue the country simply because their securities "are more risky than U.S. Treasuries". “Let European governments and the European Central Bank rescue Greece", he said. Over to you Herr Bruederle.
And despite the fact that Joaquin Almunia strenuously denied in Davos that any kind of plan "B" existed, really they would be fools not to have a plan "B", and the people involved obviously aren't fools, ergo....
A top European Union official said on Friday there was no risk that Greece would default or leave the euro zone and the country's finance minister said he was not aware of any bailout talks. "No, Greece will not default. Please. In the euro area, the default does not exist because with a single currency the possibility to get funding in your own currency is much bigger," Monetary Affairs Commissioner Joaquin Almunia told Bloomberg TV. "There is no bailout problems."
Asked if its problems could force Greece out of the euro zone, Almunia said: "no chance. Because it is crazy to try to solve the problems the Greek economy has outside the euro zone," he said. Almunia said euro zone ministers had prepared fiscal recommendations for Greece and other countries, to be discussed at a regular meeting at European Commission level next week, but denied there was any special EU plan to rescue Greece. "It is a normal analytical document that is written every month," he said. "We have no plan B. Plan A is on the table. It is fiscal adjustment."
EU Commission "Ups the Ante"
So now lets turn to Plan A, and to that normal analytical document Señor Almunia refers to, which is due to be discussed by the Commission on Wednesday. Fortunately, the Greek web portal Ta Enea have seen the document, and Reuters have provided us with a convenient English language version of what they saw. What the Ta Enea report makes clear, is that the reason Greek Prime Minister Papandreou has not asked the EU for a "bailout loan" is connected to the conditions which would be attached to that loan. According to the reports, the EU Commission plan to go a lot further than simply providing short term funding on the cheap:
The European Union will tell Greece next week to take extra measures by May 15 to shore up its finances and cut a spiralling deficit, Greek newspaper Ta Nea said Saturday, citing a draft of the recommendations. The European Commission's recommendations, due to be made public on February 3, include cutting nominal wages in the public sector and setting a ceiling for high pensions, Ta Nea said.
Under the headline "Urgent measures to be taken by 15 May 2010," the EU document will tell Greece to "cut average nominal wages, including in central government, local governments, state agencies and other public institutions." The EU will also urge Greece to introduce advance tax payments for the self-employed and possibly a tax on luxury goods, according to the document, excerpts of which were printed by Ta Nea. Most other recommendations, as reported in the paper, are already part of the Greek plan.
Reports also mention putting a complete freeze on public sector hiring, and a system of monthly reports to the Commission along the lines of the Latvian programme. What this effectively amounts to is enforcing the implementation of an internal devaluation process along the lines of the ones adopted in Ireland and Latvia, as outlined in the most recent technical report to the commission (see here), in order to restore competitiveness to the economy and make Greek debt sustainable in the long run. It also amounts to an effective surrendering of part of Greece's national sovereignty to the EU Commission, and this is the part that virtually everyone is doubtless baulking at.
IMF Waiting On the Sidelines
Obviously, the EU Commission is not the only institution who could furbish the bailout loan, the IMF would serve just as well, and Marek Belka, Director of the IMF's European Office, has already made it very plain they are ready willing and able to help. And only last Friday John Lipsky, the first deputy managing director of the IMF, said the Fund "stands ready" to help Greece with its debt crisis. According to Lipsky's statement, the fund is in "ongoing contact" with the Greek authorities following a "scoping mission" to assess the possibilities.
"The IMF stands ready to support Greece in any way we can," Mr Lipsky said. "It is a matter for the Greek authorities to decide, in collaboration with the European Union, but we are here to help if we are wanted."
In fact, I personally favour the IMF alternative, given the time scale involved, and the likely programme implementation difficulties, and according to Edmund Conway, economics editor of the UK Daily Telegraph, this view is now shared by many "highly respected" economists:
I understand that in many of the conversations Mr Papandreou had [last week in Davos] with very senior, respected economists this week, he was directly advised to go to the IMF, which would be the 'cleanest solution'..... But an IMF intervention would have potentially to be channelled through European authorities, since Greece is a member of the euro.
But the EU Commission seems to have very strong reservations about going for the IMF route, which is why the "bitter pill" of the EU bailout loan may well need to be swallowed. My fear here is that EU reservations may mean that history sadly repeats itself, the first time in Latvia and then in Greece, as queasiness about taking on board the full implications of what is involved in correcting competitiveness distortions leads to policy-making delays and mistakes of the kind which in Latvia have produced a resession which is far deeper and longer than was actually needed, but which in Greece could easily lead to very serious problems for the entire Eurozone further on down the line.
Yet the door is certainly not closed on an IMF solution, and George Papaconstantinou did meet with IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn on Friday on the sidelines of the WEF in Davos. The possibility of IMF intervention was left open by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn in an interview with broadcaster France 24 this weekend, although he certainly seemed to suggest that EU support was more likely. "We at the IMF are ready to intervene if asked, but that's not necessarily required," Strauss-Kahn said. "The European authorities, both in Brussels and the central bank, are looking at it and I think they'll handle it properly" ...."solidarity" within the countries sharing the euro could "fix the problem,", he said without elaborating.... "It's the first test of this kind for the euro zone,".
Contagion Danger Concentrating Minds
Perhaps the strongest argument to support the idea of imminent EU support is the level of contagion risk being experienced. Concerns that Athens may not be able to service its debt have put growing pressure on the euro, and even if some would welcome this as an aid to German export competitiveness, the attendent credibility issues hardly make the situation a desireable one. There are also growing worries that the Greek debt crisis could spill over to other weak members of the Eurogroup, such as Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy. The German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung last week quoted an EU draft memorandum as saying the situation in Greece was creating a "big challenge and in the long term risky," and could force other euro-zone countries to pay higher risk premiums on their bonds. The spread between Portuguese and German 10-year government debt rose to 120.5 basis points on Friday - up from 114.9 the day before, and the spread on equivalent Spanish bonds is hovering round the 100 basis points mark. Basically, as one European leader after another stresses, it is hardly desireable to let Greece's problems lead other states to have to pay more to finance their borrowing.
Where's The Moral Hazard?
Finally, there has been considerable discussion about the dangers of moral hazard in the Greek case. If the EU offer a bailout loan, this will encourage other countries to seek something similar, so the argument goes.
"Moral hazard considerations suggest that the ECB will never openly support a bailout, but we doubt that Greece will be left on its own if the situation were to become critical," UniCredit analysts said. They referred to the danger that a rescue could reinforce ill-considered fiscal practices that have caused serious problems for Greece and others.
But if we look at the realities of the present situation, then it is clear that what is being offered to Greece in return for a possible loan is clearly not enticing, and indeed it may well be that countries would rather not accept the carrot in order to avoid the stick.
But there are other versions of moral hazard at work here. The FT's Martin Wolf put his finger on one of them:
At the same time, a bail-out by the eurozone as a whole would create a monstrous moral hazard for politicians. It would only be possible if the eurozone subsequently exercised a degree of direct control over the fiscal decisions of member states. It would, in short, be the fastest route to the political union that many initially believed was a necessary condition for success.
Indeed, the very creation of a monetary union in the absence of a political will for unification could be seen as having been the biggest moral hazard risk taken on board, and no matter how many clauses you put in Treaties beforehand, this risk cannot be avoided when push comes to shove.
But there is a third, and more dangerous version of moral hazard in play here, and this arises from the fact that the EU Commission may itself fail to adequately identify and diagnose the roots of the problem, with the result that the correction measures prove to be inadequate, sending Greek debt snowballing off into default. At this point, if the Greek leaders had been simply "following orders", then a more substantive form of bailout would become inevitable, and Herr Bruederle's fears that the German taxpayer may end up having to foot part of the bill would be realised. With this in mind, I really suggest that Commission members and Finance Ministers think very carefully about what they are doing before signing and sealing any definitive agreement with Greece. On the other hand, if the nettle is cleanly grasped, and the necessary changes are introduced both in Greece and in the EU's institutional structure, then maybe the most important and most enduring outcome of the current economic crisis will be a Europe which is more unified and effective than ever it was before.
Cutting Through "Red Tape" -- with a Chainsaw!

What once was ironic is now sad.
Retail Sales Plunge in Italy, Dip Elsewhere in Euro-Zone
European retail sales contracted in May to the lowest level since October 2010, driven by a “sharp drop” in Italy, Markit Economics said.Eurozone retail sales fell in May
A gauge of euro-area retail sales fell to 48.8 from 52.2 in April, London-based Markit Economics said today in a statement. The index is based on a survey of more than 1,000 executives and a reading above 50 indicates month-on-month expansion.
Italian retail sales declined at the fastest pace in 11 months in May, while monthly increases in Germany and France, the euro area’s largest economies, were the weakest in seven and three months, respectively, Markit said.
Please consider Eurozone retail sales fell in May
Retail sales in the Eurozone fell for the first time in three months in May, according to Markit’s latest PMI (Purchasing Managers' Index) survey. Moreover, sales were only marginally higher than one year earlier, and retailers cut both staff levels and purchasing during the month. Of the three largest euro economies covered, Italy remained the main source of weakness, while France and Germany both registered slower growth.Retail Sales by Country
Across the Eurozone as a whole, retail sales were up only slightly on a year earlier in May. This was in contrast to the trend seen in April, when retail sales grew at the fastest annual pace in nearly three years (although this partly reflected the timing of Easter in 2011 compared to 2010).
In line with the pattern for month-on-month sales trends, Germany and France registered slower annual growth of retail sales in May while Italy posted a steep fall.
In a further sign that the retail sector was contracting, the value of goods purchased by retailers fell during the month. This was the first drop in purchasing activity for seven months.
Moreover, it occurred despite a further sharp rise in average wholesale prices, suggesting a steep fall in the volume of new items bought for resale. Purchase price inflation eased slightly since April, but remained relatively sharp.
Reflecting intense cost pressures and declining sales values, retailers suffered the worst drop in gross margins for a year in May. This contributed to a decline in headcounts in the sector, the first since last November.

That is one hell of a drop for Italy.
Note how poorly Italy fared in the 2008-2009 recession compared to France and Germany. Unless this is an outlier, Italy is headed for recession. Is the ECB prepared for that? Are the bond markets?
Italy 10-Year Government Bonds

If Italian government bonds break North of that range, not led by a general rise across the Euro-Zone, especially Germany, then kiss contagion-containment goodbye.
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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Puzzling Article By Roger Lowenstein
Lowenstein singles out for criticism the degree to which the Fed intervened to bail out Bear Stearns, arguing that it "interrupted the cycle of boom, bust and renewal that leads to a durable recovery." But what's puzzling is that he thinks the Bear bailout sets a bad precedent because "the borders of finance are...nebulous," and that "[h]owever pure of motive, Bernanke & Co. are underwriting overleveraged markets whose linkages, even today, are dimly understood."
The Bear Stearns bailout was necessary precisely because the linkages of the financial markets are so poorly understood, and the borders of finance are so nebulous. We know that global financial markets are more interconnected today than ever before -- what Richard Bookstaber termed "tight coupling" in his excellent book A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds, and the Perils of Financial Innovation -- but we don't know exactly where all the connections are. Lowenstein is right that this makes the borders of finance more nebulous, but he doesn't seem to realize that this also makes the borders of financial catastrophe more nebulous. Bear Stearns's collapse could have had ripple effects way beyond anything we would consider a normal economic "cycle of boom, bust and renewal."
Lowenstein says that if the Fed had let Bear fail, then "perhaps, after some bad weeks or months, Wall Street would have recovered." But the simple fact that Wall Street might not have recovered, and the collapse of one relatively small bank might have caused a global financial meltdown, required that the Fed intervene. Lowenstein is confusing deleveraging with systemic failure, and recessions with depressions. Deleveraging and recessions can sometimes be cleansing to an economy. Systemic failure and depressions do not involve "cleansing," but rather vicious cycles of self-destruction. Deleveraging and recessions are part of a normal economic cycle. Systemic failure and depressions are not.
Law Professor: "We're Going To Have Casinos In Las Vegas Reconstituting Themselves As Bank Holding Companies and Applying for Government Loans"
An article by McClatchy includes two must-read quotes on the bailout:
"I could say I told you so," said Rep. Joe Barton, R-Texas, who helped lead a revolt against GOP leaders and sunk the $700 billion plan on its first pass. "It was so open-ended and we put so little accountability into it, they can basically do whatever they want to with the money."
***John Coffee, a law professor at Columbia University in New York and adviser to Wall Street regulators, said the government missed an opportunity by taking equity stakes in banks without attaching requirements that they use the bailout funds for new loans to spur the economy.
"If we could do this all over again . . . you could have conditioned the loan (plan) on how the proceeds could be used," he said. "Some banks are still hoarding the money . . . and others simply are not interested in lending in areas where they classically lent, like construction lending, because they see a major recession coming. . . .
"Before this is over that we're going to have casinos in Las Vegas reconstituting themselves as bank holding companies" and applying for government loans, Coffee warned.
Italian Inflation January 2008

The most significant impact of this inflation data in the short term is that it virtually guarantees that the European Central Bank will keep interest rates at a six-year high of 4% when they meet on Feb. 7 since according to their statues inflation has to be a greater concern than slowing economic growth. Inflation in the 15 nations sharing the euro accelerated to a 14-year high of 3.2 percent in January according to the recent flash estimate, overshooting the bank's 2 percent limit for a fifth month.
In Italy, transportation costs, which include gasoline, rose 0.4 percent from a month ago, according to the national (NIC) index. No breakdown is given at this point of the EU-harmonized index, since this awaits the official publication by eurostat later in the month. Prices of housing, water, electricity and fuel jumped 1.5 percent in the month. Food and beverage costs rose 0.6 percent from December.
Italy Retail Sales November 2007
Europe at the Abyss; US Housing in the Abyss; Who is to Blame?
It has come to this. A year after rescuing Greece from default, Europe is staring into the abyss. The bailout has proved insufficient. Greece needs more money, and it can't borrow from private markets where it faces interest rates as high as 25 percent. There is no easy escape."Markets Failed" Says Desmond Lachman
What's called a "debt crisis" is increasingly a political and social crisis. Already, unemployment is 14.1 percent in Greece, 14.7 percent in Ireland, 11.1 percent in Portugal and 20.7 percent in Spain.
Some causes of Europe's plight are well-known: the harsh recession following the 2008-2009 financial crisis; aging populations coupled with costly welfare states. But there's also another less recognized culprit: the euro, the single currency now used by 17 countries.
Launched in 1999, it aimed to foster economic and political unity. For a while, it seemed to succeed. In the euro's first decade, jobs in countries using the common currency increased by 16 million.
It was a mirage. For starters, the euro fostered a credit bubble that led to booms in housing, borrowing and consumer spending. But one policy didn't fit all: Interest rates suited to Germany and France were too low for "periphery" countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain).
Money poured into the periphery countries. There was a huge compression of interest rates. In 1997, rates on 10-year Greek government bonds averaged 9.8 percent compared to 5.7 percent for similar German bonds. By 2003, Greek bonds fetched 4.3 percent, just above the 4.1 percent of German bonds.
"The markets failed. All this would not have occurred if banks in Germany and France had not lent so much," says economist Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. "It was like the U.S. housing market." Both American and European banks went overboard in relaxing credit standards.
Few economic statement make my hair stand straight up more than that bit of complete nonsense from Lachman. The markets did not fail. Bureaucrats who dreamed up the Euro failed.
Those bureaucrats devised a currency union with nothing more than suggestions on fiscal controls. Making matters far worse, countries in the Euro-Zone have widely differing political philosophies and policies.
That currency union was not brought about by the market. The free market would never have done such a silly thing.
Every major currency union in history without a political and fiscal union has failed. There is a nice Table of Monetary Unions on the site Euro Know that shows just that.
Bureaucrats, not the free market knew better. Bureaucrats, not the free market failed.
Not Different This Time
Potential problem were recognized well in advance by many. In February 1995 The Independent wrote a misguided editorial Why we say Yes to a single currency.
The rationale of The Independent was "It's different this time".
The economic arguments that, on balance, Britain will be better off inside the currency union than outside are persuasive. The discipline of a permanently fixed exchange rate would significantly reduce the risk of a return to high inflation and create greater certainty for companies and investors. There would also be lower transaction costs. There is no doubt that a successful single currency would strengthen Europe's position on the global economic stage.Points of Failure Predicted In Advance
The opponents of the single currency do not agree. They argue that the experience of the ERM and events since Black Wednesday show that to be locked into a single currency is damaging. Exchange rates, they point out, can act as important "shock absorbers" in times of unexpected crisis. These are powerful arguments. They are most powerful when applied to some EU members - notably Spain, Portugal and Greece - whose less developed economies would make the exigencies of a single currency regime punishing, unpopular and potentially disastrous.
But this is not the condition of Britain today. In 1992 the needs of the British economy were at odds with the priorities of the Bundesbank. They were trying to control inflation, we needed to get out of recession. By contrast, in 1999 six or seven countries will find themselves at the same stage in the cycle, with very similar economic priorities. So things are likely to be different.
Things were not different were they?
Ironically, in that 1995 article, The Independent pointed out the exact points of failure: Spain, Portugal and Greece.
Tony Dolphin, Chief Economist of AMP Asset Management, wrote a response to that article less than a week later. Please consider, European monetary union: the benefits, the problems and the traveller's tale
The potential benefits of European monetary union are questionable, the potential costs could be very serious. A successful monetary union requires that the economies joining it are broadly the same, especially in regard to their response to external and internal inflation shocks. This is not the case in Europe. Take two examples: oil and housing.Failure of the "One Size Fits Germany Policy"
The effect of a sustained, steep rise in the oil price will be very different in Germany, which is highly dependent on imported oil and gas; in France, where nuclear power is used to generate a high proportion of energy needs; and in the UK, where the North Sea sector of the economy would actually benefit. Imagine trying to set an appropriate, anti-inflationary interest rate policy for a monetary union including these three economies should the oil price double.
The housing sectors of European economies also differ, with the UK's high level of home ownership financed by variable rate mortgages not being found elsewhere. It is easy to envisage a situation where the interest rate policy of a European monetary union was entirely inappropriate for the housing sector of the UK economy.
These and other structural differences between European economies will not disappear over the next four years, nor at any time in the foreseeable future. Until they do, the economic argument against European monetary union is powerful, and far more clear cut than the political arguments for or against.
Yours faithfully,
Tony Dolphin
Chief Economist
AMP Asset Management
I have no idea what Tony Dolphin is doing today but put him in the class of those who can say "I told you so." Here is the key paragraph:
"It is easy to envisage a situation where the interest rate policy of a European monetary union was entirely inappropriate for the housing sector of the UK economy."
The UK did not adopt the Euro but Spain did. Interest rates in Germany were not appropriate for Spain. The result was a Spanish housing bubble of epic proportion that has now collapsed.
One interest rate policy simply does not work. For further discussion, please see ECB's "One Size Fits Germany" Policy; Rate Hikes to Stress PIIGS
Compounding Spain's misery, Trichet has embarked on a rate-hiking campaign at the worst possible time, with Spanish unemployment in excess of 20%, and youth unemployment near 40%.
Housing Market Nonsense
Note that Lachman also blames US banks for the housing bubble.
"It was like the U.S. housing market." Both American and European banks went overboard in relaxing credit standards.
That too is nonsense in that it does not place the blame where it belongs, on the Fed. The Fed held interest rates too low, too long. Money was too loose, banks lent.
Blaming banks for lending when real interest rates are hugely negative is tantamount to placing a bottle of vodka in front of an alcoholic, telling the alcoholic it is the best vodka in the whole world, then blaming the alcoholic for what happens next.
Fed is the Problem
Not only did the Fed hold interest rates too low, too long, the Greenspan Fed endorsed derivatives, subprime loans, and adjustable rate mortgages. Meanwhile Bush was praising the "Ownership Society" and Barney Frank was in the back pocket of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Ben Bernanke was totally clueless, in complete denial about the bubble, going so far as to say home prices were "based on fundamentals".
None what has transpired has had remotely anything to do with the failure of the free markets. We have a failure of regulation, not a failure to regulate. Lachman, like Bernanke, really needs to get a clue.
You cannot fix a problem until you understand what the problem is. Unfortunately, politicians and economists in both the US and Europe are still in denial. Statements by those blaming markets instead of politicians and the Fed, do not help.
Addendum:
The biggest failure of regulation was the very creation of the the Fed. That should be be obvious but the sad state of affairs in regards to economic understanding says I need to spell it out.
Those screaming about the free market need to answer this question: Could the free market possibly have done any worse the serial bubble-blowing moral-hazard policies of the Fed?
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
Click Here To Scroll Thru My Recent Post List
Morocco: Antigovernment protesters clash with police; Kuwait: 2,000 rally to demand resignation of embattled prime minister
Morocco
Antigovernment protesters clash with police
Thousands of demonstrators Sunday took to the streets of Casablanca, the country's largest city, in an antigovernment protest police struggled to disperse, driving into the crowd on motorcycles, armed with clubs.Protesters in Casablanca
A similar protest in the capital's twin city of Sale on Sunday also was violently disrupted, as was a demonstration in front of the Moroccan parliament Saturday.
Moroccan Police Battle Crowds
The LA Times credits the videos to well-known blogger named "Mamfakinch" (which roughly translates as "We won't give up").
Kuwait
2,000 rally to demand resignation of embattled prime minister
Pressure is building on Kuwait's embattled Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Mohammad Ahmad Sabah, who has come under fire for refusing to be questioned in parliament for allegedly misusing public funds, among other accusations.Much of the world is simmering from high unemployment, corruption, rising food prices, and austerity programs.
Around 2,000 people took to the streets of the oil-rich gulf country's capital amid tight security, chanting, "The people want to topple the head [of government]," in reference to Sheikh Nasser, according to [news agency] Agence-France Presse.
The 71-year-old Sheikh Nasser's five years as premier have been marked by turbulence and he has come under constant fire by the opposition. He has resigned six times, and he formed his seventh Cabinet a couple of weeks ago.
Kuwaiti protesters are reportedly staging new rallies next Friday that they have dubbed "Day of Departure."
Mike "Mish" Shedlock
http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com
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A New Spectre Is Haunting Europe, A Spanish One
France Is Recovering, And The Rebound Is Robust
First it was just a rumour, then it was a possibility, and now it has become a reality - some of Europe’s economies are springing back into life. But only some. It all began quietly, with a barely noticeable 0.3% quarterly growth in French and German GDP in the second three months of this year. France and Germany will have maintained their modest growth into the third quarter , while Italy has now joined them, leaving only Spain among the Eurozone big four, registering yet another quarter contraction, and, more importantly, showing no evident sign that an early return to normal activity is anywhere near to the horizon.

In fact Spanish gross domestic product fell 0.4 percent quarter on quarter in the third quarter following a 1.1 percent drop between April and June , according to the Bank of Spain monthly bulletin. Spain's GDP also contracted 4.1 percent year on year in the quarter, after a contraction of 4.2 percent in the second three months.
'This is the least pronounced contraction since the beginning of the recession ... and this improvement is linked to state-backed measures with a temporary effect,' the bank said.
To this government stimulus effect, I would also add the net trade effect which is being felt as a result of the strong fall in imports, and the consequent closing of the current account deficit. With imports falling faster than exports (on an annual basis) the net impact is positive growth in the headline GDP number, and the Spanish CA deficit was closing very rapidly indeed in the third quarter (see chart below).
The impact of the stimulus package can also be seen in the seasonally adjusted unemployment numbers supplied to Eurostat by the Spanish Statistics Office (INE). Unemployment (which hit 19.3% in September - see chart below) has been rising continuously since mid 2007, but the sharpest increases were registered during the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. 
It is very hard to see any real difference in the trend rate of increase between the second and third quarters of 2009, and we should expect this trend job attrition rate to continue until it once more accelerates under the impact of either the government being unable to continue funding the stimulus, or the banking sector having a financial crisis (possibly induced by someone being forced into trying to sell some of the housing units they are accumulating only to discover that there are no buyers, since the market is effectively dead).
Life, Unfortunately For Spain, Is Elsewhere
But for all our preoccupations growth in 2009 is now no longer the issue. All eyes are gradually moving towards the outlook for 2010, and it is here that those little red lights have suddenly started flashing over at the European Central Bank.
And the problem is a real and growing one, since according to a series of reports which have been published during the last week, while activity in the export dependent German economy remained very fragile, the French one has really starting to hum. The first sign of this came on Tuesday, with the initial reading for the October Purchasing Manager Index which showed that while the Eurozone economy in general entered the fourth quarter on a strong note, with growth accelerating in both manufacturing and services sectors, the private sector in France started to earn alpha grades by clocking up a third successive month of accelerating growth, leaving us with the impression that France is now seeing its steepest output expansion in nearly three years.
Then on Wednesday the ECB presented its monthly bank lending data, which showed that lending to the euro area private sector shrank by an annualised 0.3 percent in September, the first such contraction since the series began in 1992. But looking a little more closely at a lending activity on a country by country basis, we find that while lending continues to contract in Spain, in France the credit cycle has turned, and indeed lending to households is now once more rising steadily (see chart below), indeed it never fell below an annual 4% rate of increase and the annualised quarterly growth rate in lending has been rising since the end of the first quarter.
That is to say, credit is once more starting to flow freely round the French economy, while here in Spain banks continue to accumulate reserves, lending generously to the government, while money for struggling small companies and for young people looking to buy homes is hard to find. What is more, if we look at the chart below (which was prepared by Dominique Barbet and Martine Borde for PNB Paribas) we will see that the stock of unsold new homes – which was in any event never very high in France, maybe 100,000 in the spring – is down by 20% as sales steadily pick up again, while here in Spain we continue to play a guessing game to decide just how many (more than a million surely) such properties there are here, and the number is growing, not declining, since real new sales to private individuals (as opposed to newly completed properties contracted two years or so ago, or exchanges between developers and banks) are almost non existent at this point. Everyone knows prices will fall further, and are waiting for them to go down.
Then on Friday we had the key piece of information, which confirmed what many of us already suspected, since Markit PMI data for October retail sales made plain the presence of very divergent trends across the Eurozone, with ever more robust growth in France contrasting with falling sales in Germany and Italy. As Jack Kennedy, economist at survey organisers Markit Economics said “While the sense of growing optimism should be treated with some caution – it appears the increase in sales was also supported by widespread discounting and the continuation of the government’s car scrappage scheme – the outperformance of France relative to Germany and Italy offers further evidence that it is France that is leading the Eurozone recovery.”
And here, with this very outperformance comes the problem, since the ECB policy rate will be set to target average eurozone inflation, which will certainly be lower than inflation in France, and possibly significantly lower. Which means the ECB policy rate will be below the one which the French economy will, in reality, need.
Between 2000 and 2008 the structural dynamics of the Eurosystem were different from now. Spain was the "exceptional student", with above-average growth, and inflation which was consistently over the Eurozone average, and for long periods above the ECB policy rate. This had the consequence, of course, that French inflation was nearly always below the average. Now things have changed. We are coming out of recession with a eurozone divided into three groups. French growth is becoming robust, while Germany and Italy are dependent on exports and just keeping their head above water. Spain, on the other hand, fails to recover and continues to contract. This is what makes the current situation critical, since starting in 2010 France will have an inflation rate over the EU average, and in all probability over the ECB interest rate. Which means that if something isn't done, and soon, to force the situation in Spain, and produce a recovery, France will have negative interest real rates during a sharp economic rebound, with all the risks that that implies.
Only last Wednesday Norway became the first western European country to raise interest rates since the start of the financial crisis after its central bank reported finding “signs of renewed growth” in the global economy. Central bankers from across the global, from Washington, to Sydney, to Delhi and to Oslo are all now busily telling us they are going to take increasing account of future accelerations in asset prices in an attempt to avoid repeating policy mistakes that are presumed to have inflated two speculative bubbles in a decade – and left the entire Spanish economy in a lamentable state. If France had its own monetary policy I have no doubt La Banque de France would be itching to follow the Norges Bank and raise rates, but there is one small problem, La Banque de France has no capacity to decide on monetary policy in this way, and herein lies the heart of what is now Europe and the ECB’s greatest dilemma.
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Equity futures are down sharply in Asia, Australia, Europe, and the US in conjunction with data that shows manufacturing in China is barely ...
